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Abstract  
 
The question of the minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is 
one which regularly arises. The recent confirmation of the abolition of the 
presumption of doli incapax raised some concerns about the resultant treatment of 
young people in the criminal justice system. This paper approaches this issue from 
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the perspective of England and Wales ’ compliance with human rights obligations. 
The application of the substantive criminal law is analysed with respect to its 
compliance with relevant international human rights standards. Research relating to 
the engagement of the criminal justice process with young people is examined, 
leading to a conclusion that the position in practice bears more consideration to the 
status of young people than the substantive law might initially suggest. However, 
concerns relating to arbitrariness in this practice lead to a conclusion that raising the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility is desirable. 
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Introduction 
The minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is ten years of 
age. Below this age children cannot be convicted of any criminal offence.1  It is often 
pointed out that this age is low in comparison with other European legal systems,2 
and that this young age is out of step with ‘ages of responsibility’ in other areas of 
the law (such as driving a car, purchasing cigarettes and alcohol, voting in elections, 
getting married, having sexual relationships, serving on a jury, entering contracts and 
choosing to refuse medical treatment), which are typically in the sixteen to eighteen 
age bracket. It is also suggested that the low minimum age of criminal responsibility 
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in England and Wales is of dubious compatibility with obligations under various 
international human rights instruments. This paper explores the last of these 
arguments through an analysis of substantive criminal law and contemporary English 
criminal justice practice. The first part of the paper provides an exposition of the 
relevant international human rights provisions. Parts two and three examine the 
extent of compliance with these norms in the substantive criminal law and criminal 
justice process respectively.  
 
The International Human Rights Framework 
 
Various human rights norms potentially impact on the question of the criminal 
responsibility of children. This paper focuses, in particular, upon the Beijing Rules, 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) and the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 
Beijing Rules 
International human rights instruments were relatively slow to give specific and 
careful attention to youth justice in general and to the question of the appropriate 
minimum age for criminal responsibility in particular. The first to do so in any detail 
was the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (the so called Beijing Rules). These rules are not binding, states are merely 
invited to apply them, but because of their relative specificity on the age of criminal 
responsibility question, they are important. The original draft of the rules had stated 
that an age below 12 years would seem ‘hardly compatible with the legal and social 
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implications of criminal responsibility’.3 However, agreement could not be reached on 
this part and it was excluded from Article 4(1) which provides: ‘In those legal systems 
recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles, the 
beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the 
facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity. ’ An official ‘Commentary’ is 
attached to the Rules, and is viewed as a central part of them. This states that there 
should be ‘a close relationship between the notion of responsibility of delinquent or 
criminal behaviour and other social rights and responsibilities (such as marital status, 
civil majority, etc.).’  
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
In contrast to the Beijing Rules, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCROC), which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 20 November 1989, has binding force under international law. Although it 
has not been incorporated into the domestic law of England and Wales, it is 
regarded as a crucial source of human rights norms. It makes wide ranging provision 
for the protection of children (under 18s) and a number of its articles are directly or 
indirectly relevant to the treatment of children by the criminal law. In Article 3(1) a 
centrally important general principle is stated: ‘In all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be 
a primary consideration.’ Article 37(a) provides a hard concrete floor of protection for 
children against the most punitive type of penal intervention (capital punishment, 
whole life time imprisonment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment) and 37(b) a softer, but nevertheless firm, protection against criminal 
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justice intervention more generally: ‘arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child’ 
should be ‘used only as measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate 
period of time.’ Article 40(1) provides guidance on the manner in which children 
‘recognised as having infringed the penal law’ should be treated, and this must be 
‘consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth’ and, 
specifically, must ‘take into account the child's age’ and ‘the desirability of promoting 
the child's reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society.’ 
Article 40(3)(a) requires ‘the establishment of a minimum age below which children 
shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law’. This is 
generally interpreted as requiring a minimum age of criminal responsibility below 
which a child cannot be subject to criminal law but, as per the Beijing Rules, no 
particular minimum age is specified as an acceptable norm. Finally, Article 40(3)(b) 
provides a steer towards a policy of diversion from formal criminal justice processing 
of children, although the inclusion of the phrase ‘whenever appropriate and 
desirable’ provides  a state with considerable latitude to pay lip service should it not 
wish to embrace the spirit of this particular injunction. In S and Marper v the United 
Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) referred to the UNCROC 
and stressed that its central message with regard to criminal justice was the 
importance of treating young people differently.4  
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 
The ECHR is of crucial importance to the position in England and Wales as, in 
contrast to the previously discussed international human rights instruments, since 
the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998, citizens are able to rely on 
Convention rights directly in the domestic courts. The ECHR does not, however, 
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have much to say regarding the position of children specifically in relation to the 
criminal law. This is not to say that the ECHR is irrelevant, however. The applicability 
of the various articles of the Convention in this context was helpfully tested before 
the ECtHR in the case of T v UK; V v UK.5 This case involved the highly publicised 
criminal trial in an English Crown Court of two young boys (10 years at the time of 
the offence) for the murder of 2 year old James Bulger. The majority of the Court 
found that Article 3 of the Convention (which provides an absolute prohibition on 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) was not breached through subjection of 
the boys to the criminal justice system and nor was Article 6 (which outlines 
conditions necessary for a fair trial) breached per se by a system which permits 
criminal prosecution. However, the Court did find that the specific nature of the trial 
procedure the boys had experienced did breach their fair trial rights under Article 
6(1).  
Interestingly, five dissenting judges held that a minimum age of criminal 
responsibility as low as 10, and consequent prosecution in criminal court at age 11, 
would almost certainly constitute a breach of Article 3. This is significant as the 
ECHR is a living document. In other areas of law, as the approach of member states 
to a particular issue has evolved, dissenting positions with significant support have, a 
number of years later, been adopted by the Court.6 It is, however, difficult to discern 
precisely how generalisable the dissenting judges’ finding, regarding the minimum 
age of responsibility, was intended to be. In particular, it is unclear whether they 
intended to say that 10 and 11 year olds must be immune from any youth justice 
intervention to be compatible with Article 3, or whether only a prosecution in a 
criminal court would constitute a breach.  
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There was also an attempt in the case to develop an argument combining the fair 
trial guarantees in Article 6 with the prohibition against discrimination (in this instance 
on grounds of age) in the enjoyment of Convention rights (Article 14). The argument 
was that a child just over the age of criminal responsibility, when prosecuted, is 
subject to arbitrary and unjustifiable discriminatory treatment in comparison to a child 
just under the minimum age, and that prosecution (particularly, as in the T v UK; V v 
UK case, where it is in the adult Crown Court) is disproportionate to any legitimate 
aim of the state.7 The Court, however, did not examine this argument because the 
argument under Article 6(1) alone had been successful.  
 
Having set out the relevant human rights instruments, the principal conclusion to be 
drawn is that while no absolute minimum age of criminal responsibility is set, an 
obligation is imposed on states to ensure that in responding to offending by young 
people, careful regard is paid to their special characteristics. Contemporary 
developmental psychological research, augmented by the findings from 
neuroscience, consistently points to the distinctive features of adolescents as a 
group. It suggests that they are typically less able to ‘imagine alternative courses of 
action, think of potential consequences of these hypothetical actions, estimate 
probabilities of their occurrence, weigh desirability in accordance with one's 
preferences, and engage in comparative deliberations about alternatives and 
consequences.’8 Importantly it also suggests that for most people this will be a 
temporary, ‘adolescent limited’, experience.9 Such research has recently been 
utilised to help to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court that some of the most egregious 
examples of American penal populism (the application of the death penalty and life 
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imprisonment without the possibility of parole to under 18s) were unconstitutional.10 It 
serves to underline the necessity for a strong human rights framework in order to 
ensure both procedural and substantive protection for young people.  
Prima facie, setting the minimum age of responsibility at 10 could raise questions as 
to England and Wales’ compliance with these obligations. Indeed, on a number of 
occasions, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child in its monitoring 
reports on the UK’s compliance with the UNCROC has explicitly expressed concern 
regarding the low age of criminal responsibility.11 Goldson has argued that ‘the 
practices of unequivocally “responsibilising” and “adultifying” children from the age of 
10 years – and accordingly exposing them to the full rigour of an adversarial criminal 
justice system – as is the case in England and Wales, is clearly at odds with the core 
principles underpinning [these human rights instruments].’ He concludes that, ‘Given 
both the comparatively low age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales and 
the unmitigated exposure of children to the full weight of criminal law, the jurisdiction 
is manifestly out-of-sync with the norms of European youth justice law, policy and 
practice.’12 
Recognition of Youth in Substantive English Criminal Law 
While Goldson’s point regarding ‘exposure of children to the full weight of criminal 
law’ is understandable in the context of a comparison to practice elsewhere in 
Europe (where children are generally dealt with in entirely separate, non-criminal, 
systems), it is worth pausing to consider the various ways in which English criminal 
law does, in fact, provide some recognition of youth beyond the minimum age of 
responsibility.  
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Historically, at common law, the doctrine of doli incapax provided a rebuttable 
presumption, with regard to children above the minimum age of responsibility but 
below the age of 14, that they lacked the capacity for criminal responsibility. Thus, in 
relation to a charge against such a young person, the prosecution had to establish 
not only that the young defendant was responsible for the actus reus of the offence, 
with the requisite mens rea, in the absence of a relevant substantive defence, but 
also was compelled to rebut the presumption of doli incapax by showing that the 
child appreciated that their actions went beyond ‘mere naughtiness or childish 
mischief’ and were ‘seriously wrong’.13  
A number of commentators have noted that, in practice, prosecutors were rarely 
troubled by doli incapax.14 Nevertheless, it is clear that in the few cases where 
rebutting the presumption was problematic, it was irritating for the prosecutorial 
authorities. These irritations percolated to the surface of the judicial system in a 
number of appellate court decisions displaying considerable judicial disquiet. So, for 
example, Lord Justice Bingham was moved to observe that doli incapax could ‘lead 
to results inconsistent with common sense’. 15 Such disquiet culminated in the 
attempt of Laws J to abolish the doctrine on the basis that it was, echoing Bingham 
LJ, ‘unreal and contrary to common sense’.16 Although the House of Lords 
subsequently allowed the Appeal in that case, because to do otherwise would 
involve inappropriate ‘judicial legislation’,17 four members of the Committee strongly 
suggested that Parliament should consider revising the law. This invitation was 
embraced by the then Opposition Labour Party, which was in the process of 
shedding its perceived weakness in the ‘politics of law and order’, in comparison to 
the Conservative Party. 18 It therefore proposed in a Party Paper before the 1997 
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General Election, to abolish doli incapax and legislated to that effect in the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998.19 
 
Since the abolition of doli incapax, it could be suggested that the criminal law is blind 
to youth once the tenth birthday milestone is reached. This would not, however, pay 
sufficient regard to the scope for age to be recognised in other areas of doctrine. As 
noted above, in each criminal case the prosecution must prove that the defendant 
perpetrated the relevant harm with the requisite mens rea. The principle ensures that 
the imposition of censure and punishment by the state on an individual is justified by 
only holding as criminally responsible those who can be shown to be to blame for 
committing a prohibited action.  The essence of the principle, according to Ashworth, 
is that ‘criminal liability should be imposed only on persons who are sufficiently 
aware of what they are doing, and of the consequences it may have, that they can 
fairly be said to have chosen the behaviour and its consequences’.20  In other words, 
there should be no criminal conviction without proof of fault. In some contexts, with 
regards to some forms of mens rea, age may well be a relevant factor; good 
examples are the offences of theft, and other property offences, where the mens rea 
element of dishonesty requires that the prosecution establish that the defendant was 
aware that his conduct would be considered dishonest by the ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honest people.21 Indeed in the case of I v DPP the requirements of 
dishonesty and doli incapax appear to have been treated as indistinguishable, 
suggesting that the defence, in effect, continues to operate in relation to dishonesty 
offences.22  
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Similarly, after a significant period where a controversial judicial formulation of the 
key mens rea concept of recklessness effectively excluded consideration of whether 
young defendants were, or even had the capacity to be, aware of the risk of harm 
posed by their behaviour,23 the House of Lords firmly reinstated a subjective 
formulation. In Lord Bingham’s judgment, it would be ‘neither moral nor just to 
convict a defendant (least of all a child) on the strength of what someone else would 
have apprehended if the defendant himself had no such apprehension.’24 Lord 
Steyn, was even more direct in his recognition of the need for the criminal law to be 
conscious of the particular needs and rights of children. Importantly, he relied on 
Article 40 of the UNCROC (discussed above) to argue that it not only imposed 
procedural obligations on states to protect the special interests of children in the 
criminal justice system but was also relevant with regard to the substantive law.25 
Lord Steyn might also have drawn upon the discrimination argument based on 
Articles 6 and 14, discussed above. An argument based on Article 6 had been put to 
the Court of Appeal but was rejected on the basis that Article 6 was concerned with 
procedural protections and did not engage the substantive criminal law. It is 
disappointing that none of the judges in G and Another took the opportunity to 
engage with the potential applicability of the ECHR to the application of substantive 
criminal law to children. Such an opportunity was similarly missed when the House of 
Lords recently ruled on the abolition of doli incapax.26 Nevertheless, Lord Steyn 
provides a very rare English judicial recognition of the various international human 
rights instruments having ‘bite’ in connection with substantive criminal law (as 
opposed to procedure). The approach of Lord Steyn should be welcomed. As 
discussed above, the Beijing Rules, UNCROC and the ECHR demand that the 
distinctive needs of young people are attended to when young people accused of 
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offending are dealt with. It is clearly right that procedural protections must be 
adapted to ensure young people can fully participate in the criminal justice process; it 
is not clear why this should not extend to the substantive law. As Halpin observes, 
‘The idea that these safeguards should be in place to ensure that the child is capable 
of participating in the proceedings, and then removed when it comes to determining 
the child’s criminal responsibility, is inherently absurd.’27 
 
The age of the defendant may also come into play with regard to a number of the 
substantive defences. So, for example, ‘duress by threats’ provides a defence where 
a defendant has a reasonable belief he would be seriously injured or killed were he 
not to commit the offence, and that a person of ‘reasonable firmness’ would have 
done the same.28 In assessing whether a person of ‘reasonable firmness’ would 
have so acted, the Court of Appeal specifically observed in Bowen that this objective 
evaluative standard could be adjusted to recognise youth, as ‘a young person may 
not be so robust as a mature one.’29 A similar allowance for relative youth, inherited 
from the common law defence of provocation, can also be found in the test for 
evaluating whether a defendant who lost their self-control exercised a ‘normal 
degree of tolerance and self-restraint’ in response to a fear of violence or an 
extremely grave circumstance, for the partial defence to murder of ‘loss of control’.30 
Finally, in this regard it is worth noting that in the context of sexual offences it is 
possible for defendants under the age of eighteen, in certain circumstances, to be 
prosecuted for a lesser offence with lower penalties than an adult would be in the 
same circumstances.31 
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The substantive criminal law does therefore make some allowance for relative youth, 
but it is fair to say that there are considerable limitations. As regards recognition of 
relative immaturity through mens rea, this is clearly of limited use where aspects of 
an offence require objective or even strict forms of liability. Bennion has argued that 
in ‘complex offences’, the principle of mens rea demands that the prosecution 
demonstrate that young defendants are capable of understanding the ingredients of 
the crime. In other words, the concept of mens rea contains an implicit form of doli 
incapax within itself.32 This argument has not, however, found favour with the 
appellate courts. Moreover, even in situations where a young person is accused of 
an offence with a subjective form of mens rea this, in reality, serves only a minimally 
protective function. There are two principal reasons for this. First, orthodox 
subjectivism in English criminal law demands only a fairly narrow cognitive capacity 
in relation to the intended or foreseen harm. Young children may well appreciate that 
their behaviour could hurt someone but have a relative lack of understanding of the 
full ramifications of that harm. Secondly, a distinction needs to be drawn between 
substantive provisions and evidential questions. Given that it is impossible for fact-
finders to know what was going on inside the defendant’s head at the relevant time 
they are likely to resort to drawing inferences from their own (adult) experiences. 
The limitations of current doctrine were also exposed in the recent case of R v 
Wilson.33 In that case a 13 year old boy helped his father to kill a man. He was too 
frightened of his father’s violence to refuse. The Court of Appeal held that ‘although 
there may be grounds for criticising’ the position, the law was clear that duress was 
no defence to murder whether the defendant was the principal offender or, as in this 
case, an accessory. In his commentary on the decision Ashworth observed that it 
‘reflects badly on English criminal law. To apply the same standards to a 13-year-old 
14 
 
as to an adult is to ignore large amounts of evidence about the immaturity of 
children.’34 The inadequacy of the law of murder in recognising the distinctiveness of 
youth was understood by The Law Commission in its Report ‘Murder, Manslaughter 
and Infanticide’.35 A cogent case was made for a partial defence to murder of 
‘developmental immaturity’ based, in part, on the perversity of the present situation 
where an adult with a ‘mental age’ of ten could rely on a defence of diminished 
responsibility in response to a murder charge but an ordinary ten year old would not 
have such a partial defence. This proposal was rejected by the Government.  
As well as the provision of specific examples illustrating the limitations of current 
criminal law doctrine in accommodating young people’s needs, a wider point can be 
made about the general framework of criminal law. In England and Wales, the 
system is, in essence, underpinned by a liberal framework.  The legitimacy of 
criminal punishment, according to orthodox liberal thought, is based on an 
assumption about individuals as autonomous moral agents with capacity for free will. 
Where such an agent can be shown to have chosen to commit a criminal offence 
(without a valid justifying reason or excusatory condition) then legal punishment is 
justified. Norrie, in a series of publications, has built a powerful critique of this 
‘abstract individualism’.36 His argument, in essence, is that the criminal law’s myopic 
focus on individual responsibility and culpability, although providing a potentially 
important bulwark against drifts to authoritarianism, has the effect of marginalising 
and silencing other important explanations for the harm that has been caused by the 
crime. Empirical research suggests that youth offending is associated with a range of 
factors many of which cast serious doubt on the appropriateness of the criminal law’s 
emphasis on individual agency, responsibility and punishment. Research, for 
example, has shown strong causal connections between certain behavioural 
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disorders, such as attention deficit and hyperactivity, and youth offending and, 
moreover, that some people are genetically more likely to suffer from these 
conditions.’37 Recently, as noted above, considerable attention has been paid to 
neuro-scientific research in which new brain imaging techniques have been used to 
suggest links between differences in neural functioning and offending.38 
Criminological research has also pointed to the importance of social context in 
explaining offending, including abusive family backgrounds, poverty, school 
exclusion and lack of job opportunities.39 This research suggests that a complex web 
of responsibility surrounds each criminal act and that the reductionist tendency of 
criminal doctrine often serves to mask this. The appropriateness of criminal 
prosecution for children, which international human rights norms call into question, is 
also challenged by this body or research.  
International human rights norms demand that the distinctiveness of youth be 
recognised whenever the criminal law is applied to children. The previous section 
has shown that substantive criminal law makes some allowance for youth. However, 
it is limited, particularly since the abolition of the doli incapax doctrine, but also 
because human rights are seen as relevant primarily to procedural protections rather 
than shaping questions of liability and responsibility. When one’s focus shifts, 
however, from substantive doctrine, to criminal justice practice, there is an argument 
that the purchase of these international human rights instruments increases. 
Consider, for example, the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Decisions as to whether to 
charge and prosecute suspects must be made in accordance with the Code. The 
Code provides that ‘prosecutors must bear in mind, in all cases involving youths, that 
the United Kingdom is a signatory to the United Nations 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and the United Nations 1985 Standard Minimum Rules for the 
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Administration of Juvenile Justice.’40 It was observed above that neither the Beijing 
Rules nor the UNCROC were part of the law of England and Wales but their 
inclusion in the Code raises the question of whether these instruments are 
technically legally binding on Crown Prosecutors, and thereby challengeable in the 
courts. This issue was raised, but not decided upon in a recent judicial review.41 
What is clear is that whatever the technical legal position these norms should be 
central to prosecutorial decision making where children are involved.  
 
Young People in the Criminal Justice System 
 
Everyday and everywhere children and young people do things which cause harm. 
This occurs in the home, in the school playground, in the park, outside the local 
shop, in the city centre and elsewhere. Often this can include hurting other people or 
interfering with others’ property. Much of it could potentially come within the ambit of 
crime and criminal justice but, as Nils Christie writes, ‘Crime does not exist. Only 
acts exist, acts often given different meanings within various social frameworks. 
Acts, and the meaning given to them, are our data. Our challenge is to follow the 
destiny of acts through the universe of meanings.’42 In other words, much of the 
harmful behaviour will never be thought of by anyone as ‘crime’, far less processed 
as such. So, for example, parents will deal with acts of aggression between their 
children, and wilful acts of damage to their property, without any recourse to the label 
crime. Similarly, schools will routinely deal with harmful behaviour in the classroom 
and the playground with varying degrees of formality but only very rarely through 
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deployment of the crime label. Much the same thing could be said of all organised 
groups involved in the supervision of young people such as youth or sports clubs.  
 
There is now a considerable body of empirical evidence examining the nature and 
extent of harmful behaviour which can be attributed to young people. Much of it is 
based on the use of ‘self-report’ survey techniques. The most recent of these, in 
England and Wales, was the Home Office’s ‘Offending, Crime and Justice’ Surveys 
conducted between 2003 and 2006.43 In common with previous studies of this nature 
it was found that ‘offending’ was by no means unusual among young people in 
England and Wales. In the latest sweep of the survey it was found that more than 
one quarter (26 per cent) of the 10 to 17 year olds sampled reported having 
committed one of the harmful acts covered.44 This was higher for boys (30 per cent) 
than girls (22 per cent). A significant proportion of the youngest age bracket, 10-11 
year olds, reported having offended (17 per cent) and the peak age of offending was 
in the 14-15 year old bracket (32 per cent); the prevalence of offending fell steadily in 
each subsequent age cohort.45 The prevalence of offending reported by young 
people in the four successive sweeps of the survey did not change significantly over 
time.46 In terms of the type of misbehaviour engaged in by young people, self-report 
studies tend to find relatively high proportions of minor or even trivial offences being 
reported (e.g. dodging fares, shop-lifting, criminal damage or graffiti) whereas  
reports of more serious offences (e.g. burglary or robbery) are much rarer.47 
Although the Home Office surveys consistently found ‘assaults’ to be highly 
prevalent, many of these were  minor with little, or no, injury being caused.48 
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With such a high prevalence of behaviour which could potentially be labelled and 
processed as ‘criminal’ being committed by young people, it is not surprising that, in 
terms of formal action: ‘the typical response to youth crime is no response at all’.49 
Much of it goes undiscovered or, as noted above, is dealt with within other social 
institutions, such as the family or school. When behaviour which could be labelled as 
‘offending’ is brought to the attention of the youth justice system, generally through 
the police, significant proportions of cases do not proceed to be dealt with formally. 
For this reason changes in the numbers of offences and offenders recorded by the 
youth justice system over time do not (or do not only) reflect changes in youth crime 
rates but are, to a considerable extent,  a function of changes in processing practice. 
As one would expect, the system processes significantly fewer offences committed 
by the youngest children compared to older teenagers. So of the 198,449 proven 
offences processed in 2009/10, 903 (0.5 per cent) were committed by 10 year olds, 
and 59,490 (30 per cent) by 17 year olds.  In terms of the type of disposals the 
system imposes on young people, a significant proportion (41 per cent) are in the 
form of pre-court warnings.50 Of the court disposals, 5130 (3 per cent) were 
custodial. As far as the youngest children dealt with by the system are concerned, 94 
per cent of 10 year olds’ disposals were pre-court. Recalling the relatively high 
prevalence of self-report offending uncovered in survey research, even amongst the 
youngest age brackets, it is clear that: (i) society filters out a very large proportion of 
young people’s misbehaviour before it gets to the youth justice system; much which 
could be ‘criminal’ is not labelled as such; and (ii) the youth justice system deals with 
large proportions of the offences which are processed pre-court. 
So from  a large well of behaviour which could potentially be labelled and processed 
as criminal, the system selects only some, and it is at its most selective with the 
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youngest children. This suggests that the demands of international human rights 
norms to give due regard to the particular rights and needs of young people bites to 
a greater extent in the application (or non-application) of criminal law than in 
substantive doctrine. However, it remains the case that a substantial number of 
young people do have the criminal law applied to them and find their way into the 
youth justice process (106,969 young people in 2009/10). Furthermore, a significant  
number of young people find their way into the ‘deep’ end of the system. So, for 
example, of particular concern to the European Court of Human Rights in the case of 
T v UK; V v UK was the fact that the two young children had been prosecuted in the 
adult Crown Court rather than the Youth Court. The manner in which this was done 
was held to have breached the fair trial guarantees under Article 6 of the ECHR. 
Subsequently, a practice direction was issued which required modifications to 
procedure to be made whenever children were prosecuted in the Crown Court. 
These are supposed to ensure the child is not humiliated and can participate in the 
proceedings.51 However, ultimately, as commentators such as Fionda and Fortin 
have pointed out, whatever cosmetic changes are made, it remains a Crown Court 
trial.52 This practice continues in respect of a few thousand children each year, 
despite repeated concerns about it from the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, and the recommendation from Lord Justice Auld’s review of the criminal 
courts that the practice should stop.53 Also concerning, from a human rights 
perspective, are the children who end up being remanded or sentenced to custodial 
institutions. Although there has been a substantial decrease in recent years (the 
juvenile custodial population falling from around 3000 in 2008, to around 2000 in 
2011), the use of custody for under 18s remains high in comparison to other 
European countries.54  
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Furthermore, important recent empirical evidence shows that youth justice systems 
are not deployed on the population even-handedly. Researchers from the Edinburgh 
Study of Youth Transitions and Crime,55 (a longitudinal study following a cohort of 
children from the time they began secondary school in 1999), have found that, when 
self-reported offending was controlled for, 15 year-olds having ‘adversarial contact 
with police’ were much more likely to be low social class boys, from broken families 
and living in deprived neighbourhoods. They were also more likely to spend time 
‘hanging around’ in public spaces. Crucially, following regression analysis, ‘previous 
form’ was found to be the most powerful predictor of later adversarial police contact. 
In other words, first time contact with the youth justice system will tend to arise from 
a combination of offending (as well as other ‘risky behaviours’ such as under-age 
drinking and drug-use), coming from a certain disadvantaged background, and 
‘hanging around’ in public places with similarly situated friends. Thereafter, it is the 
‘usual suspects’ that become the recurring targets of the system. Moreover, further 
analysis has suggested that the deeper a young person is drawn into the youth 
justice system, and the more intensive the intervention, the less likely it is that they 
will desist from offending.56 In other words, consistent with the classic labelling 
theorists of the 1960s,57 and previous longitudinal research in England and 
elsewhere,58 the study suggests that youth justice intervention can have perverse 
crimogenic effects. Consequently, McAra and McVie argue for a policy of ‘maximum 
diversion and minimum intervention.’59 
The evidence of the unjustifiably unequal impact of youth justice on certain 
disadvantaged groups, and of the potentially damaging effects of youth justice 
intervention is deeply troubling and casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of a low 
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minimum age of criminal responsibility. An additional concern, as regards legitimacy, 
concerns the inequality of impact on different cohorts over time and across space. It 
is clear that the scope of the youth justice system varies over time. Thus, during the 
1970s there was a significant increase in criminal justice intervention concerning 
young people, including a marked rise in the custodial population, whereas the 
1980s witnessed a period of de-criminalisation and dramatic reductions in the use of 
custody.60 More recently, statistics on the number of offences by young people 
resulting in a court or pre-court disposal have been published since 2002/3.61 There 
was a rise of 12 per cent from 268,480 to 301,860 in 2005/6, and then a decline of 
34 per cent to 198,449 in 2009/10, which represents a drop to 66 per cent of the 
peak number of offences reached only a few years previously.62 As noted above, the 
use of custody for under 18s has also been falling recently. Given that the best 
indications we have from self-report and victim surveys is that levels of youth crime 
have been quite stable over this period, these trends are most likely attributable to 
system effects.63 While these recent downwards trends are welcome, a question of 
inter-generational justice arises as regards those children who were caught up in the 
system in the more zealous phase but who would not be so processed now. It also 
potentially arises in respect of future generations should policy and practice swing 
back in a more punitively interventionist direction in the years ahead. Significantly, 
questions of fairness, equality and justice also arise amongst current cohorts, as 
data suggests the extent and nature of youth justice intervention varies between 
different parts of the country, a ‘post-code lottery’ in common parlance, 64 and that 
there is some evidence of unjustifiable over-representation of certain ethnic minority 
groups in the system.65 
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Conclusion 
This paper has examined the substantive criminal law of England and Wales and its 
application through the criminal justice system to children and young people, against 
a framework of relevant international human rights norms. On its face, the very low 
minimum age of criminal responsibility of 10 years looks problematic: the human 
rights perspective stresses the need for the special position of young people to be 
given careful consideration. Despite the abolition of the presumption of doli incapax 
some amelioration is provided by a degree of flexibility in a range of substantive 
criminal law rules but serious limitations remain. Of much greater significance is the 
world of criminal justice practice, where discretion is used to divert the vast majority 
of potentially criminal behaviour away from formal criminal justice processing. 
Empirical research highlighting the potentially negative impact of intensive system 
contact underlines the importance of this and it is, accordingly, encouraging to see 
that there has been a reduction in the scope of criminal justice intervention in 
England and Wales over the last few years.  
 
In the final analysis, however, empirical research also demonstrates the 
discriminatory way in which the criminal sanction is distributed to young people. The 
most equitable solution to this distributive injustice is, accordingly, to raise the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility, to at least 12 years of age (in line with recent 
moves in Scotland and Ireland) but preferably to 14. This action would help to secure 
England and Wales’ fulfilment of international human rights obligations. 
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